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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
WESLEY ALLEN TUTTLE, | 
Defendant-Appellant, ; 
) Case No. 20068 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
STATEMENTS OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
Appellant was charged and convicted of criminal 
homicide, murder in the first degree under 76-5-202 (1) (g) Utah 
Code Annotated 1953 as amended in connection with the stabbing 
death of Sidney Ann Merrick, on September 26, 1983 in Summit 
County, State of Utah, for which he received a life sentence. 
This Court in State V. Tuttle P. 2 , 106 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 6 (April 12, 1989) reversed the capitol conviction, 
finding that the applicable statute if construed to be 
constitutional, could not apply to the facts to sustain that 
capitol conviction and therefore this Court reversed the 
conviction and remanded the case back to the District Court for 
entry of Judgement and conviction for Second Degree murder and 
the imposition of an appropriate sentence. Appellant in this 
petition does not challenge that finding. 
This Court however found two issues raised by Tuttle to 
have been error but made the additional finding that such error 
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was harmless. The court concluded that the admission of 
hypnoticly enhanced testimony and the exclusion of expert 
testimony regarding the effect of hypnosis on a persons memory 
were error but that such error was harmless. It is those 
findings of Harmless Error that Tuttle now requests the Court to 
Review in connection with this Petition for Rehearing. 
POINT I 
THIS COURT HAS OVER LOOKED OR 
MISAPPREHENDED THE FACTS IN 
CONCLUDING THAT THE ADMISSION OF 
HYPNOTICLY ENHANCED RECALL WAS 
HARMLESS ERROR. 
In finding that the admission of hypnoticly induced 
recall was error but harmless the Court found that the evidence 
of guilt was overwhelming. In fashioning the harmless error rule 
in Tuttle the Court directs its attention to several factors 
which include the importance of the evidence, whether or not the 
evidence was cumulative, whether or not there was any 
corroboration of that tainted evidence with other non-tainted 
testimony, and the overall strength of the States case against 
the appellant. In fashioning that rule this Court then concluded 
that the State's case was very strong and that the hypnoticly 
induced testimony was not important but cumulative and that other 
relevant parts of the contested evidence had been corroborated by 
other non-tainted evidence. 
Appellant wishes to point out to the Court certain 
facts which he believes were misapprehended or overlooked by this 
Court in arriving at that decision. 
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HANDPRINT EVIDENCE. There was uncontroverted evidence 
that a hand print located on the front bumper of the Merrick 
vehicle did not match the hand print of either the appellant or 
the victim. This is significant because, as the testimony 
established, this handprint was taken from the area on the bumper 
where there was testimony indicating that a chain had been 
attached to the automobile for the purpose of pulling or towing 
the Merrick vehicle. This evidence is significant in and of 
itself but it becomes even more significant when understood in 
view of other relevant testimony. There was uncontroverted 
testimony that a witness observed a white vehicle, similar to the 
Merrick vehicle stopped on the side of the road with it's hood up 
in and around the Lambs Canyon Area which is approximately 3 
miles from the crime scene. That same witness testified that 
there were two people on the outside of that vehicle one of which 
was a male and another of which was a female and that a pickup 
truck, not appellant's truck, but another vehicle was parked near 
the Merrick or the white vehicle. 
FORCIBLY EXTRACTED HAIRS. The one hair that may have 
matched Tuttle's hair which was found in the Merrick vehicle had 
not been forcibly extracted, or in other words pulled from the 
head. There was uncontroverted testimony that many hairs which 
were conclusively established as not being either from the victim 
or the appellant were found imbedded in Sidney Ann Merrick's 
blood soaked shirt, or inside the vehicle. The clear 
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implication of this testimony is that some other person had been 
in the vehicle with the victim at or about the time of the 
homicide and had hairs pulled from his head. Those hairs then 
became imbedded in the victims blood soaked blouse. The victim 
was found lying on her back in the vehicle. 
FINGERNAILS. There was clear and uncontroverted 
testimony that the victims fingernails were bent back indicating 
that in resisting her attackers advances she had bent her 
fingernails back, and there was also blood imbedded underneath 
the fingernails. This implies that whoever the perpetrator was, 
that he would have had scratch marks on his arms as a result of 
the victims defensive maneuvers. The testimony was 
uncontroverted that when Tuttle arrived in Evanston Wyoming that 
evening he did not have any kind of scratch marks on his body at 
all, including his arms which would have been exposed to the 
victim's defensive maneuvers. Once again the strong implication 
is that a person other that Tuttle was the perpetrator of this 
crime. 
OTHER EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY. While it is true that there was 
other testimony from eyewitnesses identifying a black truck 
towing a vehicle, there was also testimony indicating that at the 
location of the homicide there was a white car, presumably the 
Merrick vehicle, and in front of that white car there was a box 
trailer with two individuals on the outside, one was a man and 
the other a woman. The witness who testified to such a 
description was an engineer with Gibbons and Reed and had 
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absolutely no interest in the investigation other than as a 
disinterested eyewitness. That person testified that he was 
certain about that testimony because as he crested the Summit 
there was glaring from the sun on the box trailer which attracted 
his intention to that area. 
The Court in focusing on the corroborative evidence 
establishing the fact that Tuttle was present at the Summit and 
had an opportunity to commit this crime simply ignores other 
testimony from eyewitnesses which is inconsistent with the States 
account of the events. 
POINT II 
THE DENIAL OF DEFENDANT'S DUE PROCESS RIGHT TO PRESENT 
EVIDENCE IN HIS BEHALF IS NOT SUBJECT TO HARMLESS ERROR 
ANALYSIS AND REQUIRES THIS COURT TO REVERSE HIS 
CONVICTION AND ORDER A NEW TRIAL. 
The defendant has the right to due precess of law under 
Article 1 Section 7 of the Utah State Constitution and its 
Federal counter part. 
The United States Supreme COurt in Chambers vs. 
Mississippi, 92 S,Ct. 1038, 1945 (1973), held that 
the right of an accused in a criminal trial to due 
process is, in essence, the right to a fair opportunity 
to defend against the State's accusations. The right 
to confront and cross-examine witnesses and to call 
witnesses in ones ' s own behalf have long been 
recognized as essential to due process. Mr.Justice 
Black writing for the Court In re: Oliver (citation 
omitted), identified these rights as among the minimum 
essentials of a fair trial: 'A person's right to 
reasonable notice of a charge against him and an 
opportunity to be heard in his defense - a right to his 
day in court - are basic in our system of juris 
prudence; and these rights include, as a minimum, a 
right to examine the witnesses against him, to offer 
testimony, and to be represented by counsel', (emphasis 
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added). 
In Chapman v. State of California, supra the United 
States Supreme Court held, in fashioning a constitutional 
harmless error rule that there were some constitutional rights 
so basic to a fair trial that their infraction can never be 
treated as harmless error. Citing Payne vs. State of Arkansas, 
356 U. S. 560 (Coerced confession), Gideon vs. Wainewriqht, 372 
U.S. 355 (right to counsel), and Tumey vs. State of Ohio, 273 
U.S. 510 (Impartial judge). 
The United States Supreme Court also held in Washington 
vs, State of Texas, 87 S.Ct. 1920, 1923 (1976), that due process 
includes as a minimum the right to call witnesses and put on a 
defense. 
The United States Supreme Court in Rose vs. Clark, 39 
Cr.L. 3278, (1986), applied the Chapman Constitutional Harmless 
Error Rule to a Sandstrom burden shifting instruction, concluding 
that such instruction was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, but 
recognized that some errors necessarily render a trial 
fundamentally unfair. Noting at 39 Cr.L. 3279, F.N. 6, that each 
of the examples, Chapman cited as error that could never be 
harmless either aborted the basic trial process or denied it all 
together, and held at 39 Cr.L. 3279 as follows: 
Harmless error analysis thus presupposes a trial at 
which the defendant represented by counsel may present 
evidence and argument before an impartial judge and 
jury. (Emphasis added). 
The United States Supreme Court in Halloway vs. 
arkansas , 98 S.Ct 1173, 1182 (1978), held that a claim of 
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conflicting interest by an attorney was not subject to harmless 
error analysis pursuant to Chapman because it would consist of 
speculation. Where it said: 
In the case of joint representation of conflicting 
interest the evil - it bears repeating-is what the 
advocate finds himself compelled to refrain ^  from 
doing; . . . . thus our inquiry into a claim oif 
harmless error here would require, unlike most cases, 
unquided speculation. (Emphasis added). 
The error complained of here should not be subject to 
Chapmans harmless error analysis because it aborted the "basic 
trial process" i.e.. Mr. Tuttle's right to call Witnesses 
to challenge the accuracy of an eye witness. It is one thing to 
find the introduction of tainted eyewitness testimony harmless. 
It is quite another to refuse to allow Tuttle to explain to the 
trier of facts the reasons why it is tainted. 
It may well be that the jury believed in hypnosis much 
like a group of grade school kids believe in Raveen and people 
walking like chickens on stage. Tuttle should have been able to 
explain to the jury what this court recognizes in this case that 
hypnosis is unreliable and creates in the mind of a person 
hypnotized a false sense of accuracy of recall which cannot be 
broken down by even the most skilled of cross-examiners. A trial 
has been described as a search for truth. We have no quarrel 
with that proposition and in this case Tuttle should have been 
able to present the truth on hypnosis. 
CONCLUSION 
The important interest in protecting constitutional 
rights of all persons accused as well as protecting the central 
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i n t e g r i t y of the criminal j u s t i c e system requires tha t Mr. 
Tut t le ' s conviction be reversed because the error complained of 
denied Mr. T u t t l e the b a s i c t r i a l p rocess and under the 
circumstances of th is case can never be harmless. 
CERTIFICATION OF COUNSEL 
Pursuant to Rule 35 of the Rules of the Utah Supreme 
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